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Delete a flow

Remove one flow and its local retained run and step history.

Outcome

Remove one flow and its local retained run and step history.

Before you start

  • Verify authenticated identity, environment and the approved organization context before preparing an action.
  • The published application permission is workspace:write. Discover and bind the exact granted Flow workspace. Supplied ids do not grant access.
  • Session callers need read_write or admin workspace access. Auth-introspected API keys must bind that workspace and satisfy workspace:write. The application permission and workspace boundary are separate checks.
  • Authorize the documented mutation effects before CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. Fixture credentials and ids authorize no live operation.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --detail --json
topolo resources topolo-flow --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-flow --json
  • Set FLOW_WORKSPACE_ID to the exact id returned by granted workspace discovery.
  • Discover flowId using flows.list or a retained creation response in this workspace.

Request

DELETE /api/flows/{flowId}

Inspect and test this action. Save the exact input object as payload.json; resource context is supplied separately.

Input fields

FieldRequiredMeaningConstraints
flowIdRequiredExact flow.id returned by creation, flows.list or flows.get in this granted workspace.{"minLength":1}

View the full input schema through the action reference or CLI/MCP discovery.

Effects

  • Deletes scoped run steps and runs, then the core flow across separate databases; operations are not a cross-store transaction. A missing flow can return ok true. Approval and notification-outbox rows can remain, as can in-flight Workflows and already delivered external effects.
  • Session callers need read_write or admin access to the exact granted Flow workspace, in addition to the published application permission. Auth-introspected API keys use their bound workspace and workspace:write; supplying an id never grants access.

Interpret the response

This response has no new target identifier. Resolve the exact target separately through the documented resource reads.

Read flows.get for 404 and flow.runs.list for no retained runs; inspect approvals.list separately because flow deletion does not remove approval rows. Local removal does not reverse provider effects.

View the complete success schema. Success examples below preserve the actual exported Worker responses; errors have their original refusal shapes. CLI/MCP add their transport envelope, and --detail requests the full CLI response.

Worked examples

Captured from the actual exported Flow Worker with both local SQLite D1 stores and all committed migrations, synthetic Auth identity/grants and simulated Nexus, archive and Workflow-acceptance transports. Fixture credentials and identifiers authorize no live operation. No live provider invocation, credential storage, notification delivery, metering acceptance, durable Workflow execution, deployment, backup erasure or production completion is established by these captures. Refused examples explain boundaries and must not be executed as successful workflows.

Refused request · HTTP 403

Actual exported Worker response with both local SQLite D1 databases and all committed migrations; synthetic Auth/grants and simulated Nexus/archive transport. No live credentials, provider calls, delivery, deployment or durable Workflow execution proof. Scenario: read workspace grant refused.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "flowId": "synthetic_missing"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FLOW_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 403:

{
  "error": "This workspace requires read_write access",
  "code": "workspace_access_insufficient"
}

HTTP 403. The handler refused this request. Resolve the exact cause before retrying; invalid input can be refused by CLI validation before reaching the handler.

Successful request

Actual exported Worker response with both local SQLite D1 databases and all committed migrations; synthetic Auth/grants and simulated Nexus/archive transport. No live credentials, provider calls, delivery, deployment or durable Workflow execution proof. Scenario: flows.delete.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "flowId": "flow_d16b892d0e89474a8f24"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FLOW_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FLOW_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --detail --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_flow.flows.delete",
    "input": {
      "flowId": "flow_d16b892d0e89474a8f24"
    },
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<id returned by granted resource discovery>",
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "ok": true
}

HTTP 200. Read flows.get for 404 and flow.runs.list for no retained runs; inspect approvals.list separately because flow deletion does not remove approval rows. Local removal does not reverse provider effects.

Refused request · HTTP 401

Actual exported Worker response with both local SQLite D1 databases and all committed migrations; synthetic Auth/grants and simulated Nexus/archive transport. No live credentials, provider calls, delivery, deployment or durable Workflow execution proof. Scenario: anonymous action.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "flowId": "synthetic_missing"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_flow.flows.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FLOW_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 401:

{
  "error": "Authentication token required"
}

HTTP 401. The handler refused this request. Resolve the exact cause before retrying; invalid input can be refused by CLI validation before reaching the handler.

Verify the result

  • Read flows.get for 404 and flow.runs.list for no retained runs; inspect approvals.list separately because flow deletion does not remove approval rows. Local removal does not reverse provider effects.

Errors and recovery

  • Authentication token required (HTTP 401): Authenticate normally in the approved environment and organization, verify identity, then rediscover the action and its granted resource before retrying.
  • organization_required (HTTP 403): Authenticate into the specifically approved organization. Do not guess a different organization or bypass the refusal.
  • action_permission_required (HTTP 403): The credential lacks the exact published application permission. Stop and obtain authorized access; changing target ids cannot grant it.
  • workspace_required (HTTP 400): Discover an explicitly granted Flow workspace and bind its exact resource id.
  • workspace_access_insufficient (HTTP 403): Stop when the selected workspace grant is insufficient. Obtain authorized read_write or admin access, or an Auth-introspected key with the correct workspace binding and workspace:write; do not widen context or retry with guessed ids.

Preserve the exact status, response, request id and resource context. Runtime input validation, authentication and platform resource resolution can refuse a request before the handler. Dynamic dependency messages are not stable provider error codes.

Recovery boundary

After a partial or uncertain delete inspect both scoped stores through published reads before retrying. Recreating a graph makes a new id and cannot restore deleted history.

  • List flows: Read the workspace automation graphs, statuses and retained run counters.
  • List Flow runs: Read the newest retained run records for the selected workspace.
  • List Flow approvals: Read up to 200 workspace approval requests, optionally filtered by flow.

Evidence

Captured from the actual exported Flow Worker with both local SQLite D1 stores and all committed migrations, synthetic Auth identity/grants and simulated Nexus, archive and Workflow-acceptance transports. Fixture credentials and identifiers authorize no live operation. No live provider invocation, credential storage, notification delivery, metering acceptance, durable Workflow execution, deployment, backup erasure or production completion is established by these captures. Original scenario labels and response digests are retained in the source fixtures.