Topolo Docs Topolo Platform
Open workspace

Get seat health

Deliverability health of one sending seat over the last 24 hours and 7 days (the same report as seats.health.list), including breaches its sending domain causes when other seats share it. 404 not_found when the seat is not in this workspace.

Outcome

Deliverability health of one sending seat over the last 24 hours and 7 days (the same report as seats.health.list), including breaches its sending domain causes when other seats share it. 404 not_found when the seat is not in this workspace.

Before you start

  • Verify the intended environment, signed-in credential, authorized organization and the action permission workspace:read.
  • Discover and select an authorized canonical Engage workspace. Pass resourceType=workspace and resourceId separately from action input.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_engage.seats.health.get --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-engage --json

Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to the identifier of the selected authorized workspace.

Input contract

FieldRequiredDeclared constraints
idYes{"type":"string","minLength":1,"maxLength":128}

Validate, plan and execute

Build payload.json from the current schema and discovered identifiers. The action description above defines its behavior, limits, side effects and declared errors.

: "${ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID:?Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to your selected workspace identifier}"
topolo actions validate app_topolo_engage.seats.health.get --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_engage.seats.health.get --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Execute the unchanged validated read.

: "${ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID:?Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to your selected workspace identifier}"
topolo actions call app_topolo_engage.seats.health.get --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

For MCP, use topolo_get_action, topolo_validate_action, topolo_plan_action and topolo_call_action. Pass resource context separately where required; confirm:true is required for mutations.

Captured successful requests and responses

Captured HTTP 200 · seat health reports > counts the 24-hour and 7-day windows from sent messages and soft-bounce deliveries

Action input

{
  "id": "eng_seat_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "health": {
    "seatId": "eng_seat_1",
    "domain": "example.com",
    "state": "healthy",
    "status": "active",
    "pauseReason": null,
    "last24h": {
      "sent": 3,
      "delivered": 3,
      "hardBounces": 0,
      "softBounces": 1,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 1,
      "deliveryRate": 1,
      "hardBounceRate": 0,
      "softBounceRate": 0.3333333333333333,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0.3333333333333333
    },
    "last7d": {
      "sent": 5,
      "delivered": 4,
      "hardBounces": 1,
      "softBounces": 2,
      "complaints": 1,
      "replies": 1,
      "deliveryRate": 0.8,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.2,
      "softBounceRate": 0.4,
      "complaintRate": 0.2,
      "replyRate": 0.2
    },
    "softBounceDays": [
      "2026-10-02",
      "2026-10-06"
    ],
    "breaches": [],
    "domainSeats": 1,
    "overrideUntil": null
  }
}

Source test: seat health reports > counts the 24-hour and 7-day windows from sent messages and soft-bounce deliveries. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 200 · sender health policy > a stricter policy makes a seat breach

Action input

{
  "id": "eng_seat_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "health": {
    "seatId": "eng_seat_1",
    "domain": "example.com",
    "state": "healthy",
    "status": "active",
    "pauseReason": null,
    "last24h": {
      "sent": 10,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 1,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "last7d": {
      "sent": 10,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 1,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "softBounceDays": [],
    "breaches": [],
    "domainSeats": 1,
    "overrideUntil": null
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > a stricter policy makes a seat breach. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 200 · seats.resume with a breach > overrides with a note: audited, and the seat sends through the breach for 24 hours

Action input

{
  "id": "eng_seat_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "health": {
    "seatId": "eng_seat_1",
    "domain": "example.com",
    "state": "overridden",
    "status": "active",
    "pauseReason": null,
    "last24h": {
      "sent": 20,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 2,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "last7d": {
      "sent": 20,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 2,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "softBounceDays": [],
    "breaches": [
      {
        "rule": "hard_bounce_rate",
        "scope": "seat",
        "observed": 0.1,
        "limit": 0.05
      }
    ],
    "domainSeats": 1,
    "overrideUntil": "2026-10-07T08:30:00.000Z"
  }
}

Source test: seats.resume with a breach > overrides with a note: audited, and the seat sends through the breach for 24 hours. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 200 · sender health policy > a stricter policy makes a seat breach

Action input

{
  "id": "eng_seat_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "health": {
    "seatId": "eng_seat_1",
    "domain": "example.com",
    "state": "breached",
    "status": "active",
    "pauseReason": null,
    "last24h": {
      "sent": 10,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 1,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "last7d": {
      "sent": 10,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 1,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "softBounceDays": [],
    "breaches": [
      {
        "rule": "hard_bounce_rate",
        "scope": "seat",
        "observed": 0.1,
        "limit": 0.05
      }
    ],
    "domainSeats": 1,
    "overrideUntil": null
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > a stricter policy makes a seat breach. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 200 · seats.resume with a breach > overrides with a note: audited, and the seat sends through the breach for 24 hours

Action input

{
  "id": "eng_seat_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "health": {
    "seatId": "eng_seat_1",
    "domain": "example.com",
    "state": "breached",
    "status": "active",
    "pauseReason": null,
    "last24h": {
      "sent": 0,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 0,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "last7d": {
      "sent": 20,
      "delivered": 0,
      "hardBounces": 2,
      "softBounces": 0,
      "complaints": 0,
      "replies": 0,
      "deliveryRate": 0,
      "hardBounceRate": 0.1,
      "softBounceRate": 0,
      "complaintRate": 0,
      "replyRate": 0
    },
    "softBounceDays": [],
    "breaches": [
      {
        "rule": "hard_bounce_rate",
        "scope": "seat",
        "observed": 0.1,
        "limit": 0.05
      }
    ],
    "domainSeats": 1,
    "overrideUntil": null
  }
}

Source test: seats.resume with a breach > overrides with a note: audited, and the seat sends through the breach for 24 hours. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Effects and response meaning

  • Deliverability health of one sending seat over the last 24 hours and 7 days (the same report as seats.health.list), including breaches its sending domain causes when other seats share it. 404 not_found when the seat is not in this workspace.

Verify the outcome

  • Check the response against the declared output schema and the requested operation. For mutations, use the action-specific read described in the action description before any dependent operation.

Recover

For an uncertain result, inspect current retained state with a read action before retrying. Do not replay a mutation unless its contract explicitly guarantees idempotency.

Refused requests

Captured HTTP 404 · seat health reports > counts the 24-hour and 7-day windows from sent messages and soft-bounce deliveries

Action input

{
  "id": "eng_seat_9"
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "not_found",
    "message": "Seat was not found in this workspace."
  }
}

Source test: seat health reports > counts the 24-hour and 7-day windows from sent messages and soft-bounce deliveries. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Error recovery

  • HTTP 404 not_found: Rediscover the identifier using the related list or get action in the same authorized resource. Do not guess identifiers or change organization context.

Evidence and limits

  • /api/seats/{id}/health

  • Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

  • Widget/bootstrap use actual app handler but mocked worker runtime and app identity.

  • No gateway execution, live permissions, external delivery or deployed proof.

These are local route captures with synthetic identity and simulated dependencies. They do not prove live authorization, gateway execution, production state, or external delivery.