Replace organization notification policy

Outcome

Replace the managed organization complete explicit forbid set with sequential writes; clearing rules can permit more delivery.

These examples prove local handler behavior with real isolated notification SQL and explicitly simulated identity dependencies.

Before you start

• Verify pinned identity and the exact published action. Preference/address storage permits self or platform authority; organization admin alone cannot manage another user. Organization forbid rules require authority over the exact organization.

• Discover the intended user/org independently. These storage handlers do not verify target existence and stored preference lists do not resolve effective delivery. Omitted preference org_id means global wildcard *, while replacement selects organization scope through query.org_id.

• Before replacement capture the complete previous scope, review the full intended rows and inspect the validated plan. Empty rows clears explicit rules and may permit more delivery. Replacement is sequential and can leave partial state.

• Channel verify only sets a stored flag and performs no possession challenge. Retain independent authorized ownership evidence before approving it; fixture addresses are unused and authorize no live verification or outreach.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo apps --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --detail --json

Discover the authorized target user and exact organization. Read user_notification_preferences.list for each scope separately, user_notification_channels.list for stored channel_id values, or organization_notification_policy.list for the managed organization. Copy ids only from the exact selected scope. Effective delivery requires the published resolve action and delivery read-back separately.

Input fields

Effects

• Deletes this organization explicit forbid rows and inserts the complete replacement sequentially.

• Clearing or removing forbids can permit more deliveries; no message is sent.

Interpret the response

Replaces every explicit forbid row for the exact managed organization. Unique event/channel pairs are required and rows [] clears all explicit forbids, potentially permitting more delivery.

DELETE and INSERT statements are sequential; a later failure can leave only some replacement rules. No message is sent. Capture the full prior scope, read actual rows after any uncertainty and separately verify effective delivery for intended recipients/events.

Worked examples

These are complete raw target-handler responses, not CLI/gateway envelopes or live authorization proof. Synthetic users, organizations and unused addresses exist only in isolated fixtures. Discover real intended targets and review effects separately. Save only reviewed input as payload.json; validate and inspect the unchanged plan before an authorized call. --confirm assumes intended approval. Cookie/Bearer identities must consistently select the intended principal. Stored rows, ownership evidence, effective policy and actual delivered messages are separate outcomes. No fixture sends a message or performs an address challenge.

Organization administrator replaces only this organization forbid rules

Input · payload.json:

{
  "orgId": "org_example",
  "rows": [
    {
      "event_type": "*",
      "channel": "sms",
      "forbidden": true
    },
    {
      "event_type": "auth.password.changed",
      "channel": "email",
      "forbidden": false
    }
  ]
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --data @payload.json --confirm --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP call after validation and plan review:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace",
    "input": {
      "orgId": "org_example",
      "rows": [
        {
          "event_type": "*",
          "channel": "sms",
          "forbidden": true
        },
        {
          "event_type": "auth.password.changed",
          "channel": "email",
          "forbidden": false
        }
      ]
    },
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local handler response · HTTP 200:

{
  "success": true,
  "message": "Organization policy replaced",
  "data": {
    "orgId": "org_example",
    "rows": [
      {
        "organization_id": "org_example",
        "event_type": "*",
        "channel": "sms",
        "forbidden": true,
        "updated_at": 1790971419
      },
      {
        "organization_id": "org_example",
        "event_type": "auth.password.changed",
        "channel": "email",
        "forbidden": false,
        "updated_at": 1790971419
      }
    ]
  },
  "timestamp": "2026-10-02T00:00:00.000Z"
}

Empty rows clears explicit forbids and can permit more deliveries

Input · payload.json:

{
  "orgId": "org_example",
  "rows": []
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --data @payload.json --confirm --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP call after validation and plan review:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_auth.organization_notification_policy.replace",
    "input": {
      "orgId": "org_example",
      "rows": []
    },
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local handler response · HTTP 200:

{
  "success": true,
  "message": "Organization policy replaced",
  "data": {
    "orgId": "org_example",
    "rows": []
  },
  "timestamp": "2026-10-02T00:00:00.000Z"
}

Verify the result

• Read organization_notification_policy.list for the same orgId and compare the complete intended set; inspect actual rows after any uncertainty.

• Check intended effective recipient/event resolution separately, including the trusted transactional boundary. Stored replacement does not prove delivered messages.

Errors and recovery

Ordinary member cannot replace organization delivery rules

Captured local refusal · HTTP 401:

{
  "input": {
    "orgId": "org_example",
    "rows": [
      {
        "event_type": "*",
        "channel": "sms",
        "forbidden": true
      },
      {
        "event_type": "auth.password.changed",
        "channel": "email",
        "forbidden": false
      }
    ]
  },
  "response": {
    "success": false,
    "error": {
      "message": "Admin access required",
      "code": "AUTH_ERROR",
      "details": null,
      "timestamp": "2026-10-02T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  }
}

Duplicate policy event/channel pairs are refused before replacement

Captured local refusal · HTTP 400:

{
  "input": {
    "orgId": "org_example",
    "rows": [
      {
        "event_type": "*",
        "channel": "sms",
        "forbidden": true
      },
      {
        "event_type": "*",
        "channel": "sms",
        "forbidden": true
      }
    ]
  },
  "response": {
    "success": false,
    "error": {
      "message": "Invalid org policy payload",
      "code": "VALIDATION_ERROR",
      "details": [
        "rows[1] duplicates (event_type=*, channel=sms)"
      ],
      "timestamp": "2026-10-02T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  }
}

Organization policy can fail after delete and first insert; read actual rows before reviewing retry

Captured local refusal · HTTP 500:

{
  "input": {
    "orgId": "org_example",
    "rows": [
      {
        "event_type": "*",
        "channel": "sms",
        "forbidden": true
      },
      {
        "event_type": "auth.password.changed",
        "channel": "email",
        "forbidden": false
      }
    ]
  },
  "response": {
    "success": false,
    "error": {
      "message": "Failed to replace organization notification policy: Isolated second organization-policy insert failure",
      "code": "SERVER_ERROR",
      "details": null,
      "timestamp": "2026-10-02T00:00:00.000Z"
    }
  }
}

Published recovery guidance

• state_conflict (HTTP 409): Read the current resource state, reconcile the intended change, and retry only if still valid.

• AUTH_ERROR (HTTP 401): Verify pinned identity. If authenticated, respect self/platform user authority or exact organization management denial; organization ownership alone does not authorize another user address/preferences. Do not assume OAuth expiry or change context automatically.

• VALIDATION_ERROR (HTTP 400): Correct the reported fields only. Use unique event/channel pairs and valid channel-specific addresses. Validate and review the exact complete replacement again before approval.

• NOT_FOUND (HTTP 404): Refresh the target user channels list. A row for another user is not authorized by a known channel id; repeated delete is already absent, not a new successful deletion.

• SERVER_ERROR (HTTP 500): Preserve the result and read the exact stored scope before any new write. A replacement may have deleted old rules and inserted only some new ones; review finishing the intended set or restoring the captured set as a new approved replacement.

Recovery boundaries

Capture the complete previous scope before approval. Read actual rows after an uncertain outcome; review replacing with the intended or captured complete set as a separate approved mutation. This does not restore prior delivery outcomes or queued messages and may itself fail partially.

Discovery and evidence

This record belongs to app_topolo_auth. Fixtures prove actual NotificationPreferencesController and AuthController authority, validation, canonical notification SQL, duplicate/address identity and sequential replacement failure boundaries. Authenticated identities and unused targets/addresses are simulated and second-insert SQL failures injected. No live storage, ownership challenge, notification, deployment or production publication is proved.