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List observed Feed devices

Return at most 1,000 devices observed in the granted workspace, ordered by most recent observation. Protected device references are decoded, credentials are excluded, and the local mirror may be initialized.

Outcome

Return at most 1,000 devices observed in the granted workspace, ordered by most recent observation. Protected device references are decoded, credentials are excluded, and the local mirror may be initialized.

Before you start

  • Verify the authenticated identity, exact environment and pinned approved organization context before preparing an action.
  • Development stores content without encryption and uses scoped SHA-256 identifier hashes. Staging and production require envelope encryption and a provisioned application root; missing custody does not permit plaintext.
  • The published application permission is analytics:read. Discover a granted Feed workspace and bind that exact resource. Supplied identifiers and query selectors do not grant access.
  • Authorize the documented mirror, security, external-fetch, reporting, privacy or archival effects before CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. A GET request can initialize a local mirror.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --detail --json
topolo resources topolo-feed --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-feed --json
  • Select the exact granted workspace id as FEED_WORKSPACE_ID. Fixture ids authorize no live operation.

Request

GET /api/analytics/devices

Save action input as payload.json. Inspect the plan for the exact path, query and body. Set FEED_WORKSPACE_ID from granted resource discovery.

Inspect and test this action in the signed action console, then perform the verification below.

Input fields

FieldRequiredTypeConstraints
workspaceIdOptionalstringCanonical Feed workspace id. Resolve it through credential-scoped grants; it does not grant access. For archival it is also the path id and must match the resolved resource.; {"minLength":1}
workspace_idOptionalstringAlternative workspace selector accepted by the published input. Prefer one explicit granted workspace resource; do not send conflicting selectors.; {"minLength":1}

Exact input schema:

{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "workspaceId": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "description": "Canonical Feed workspace id. Resolve it through credential-scoped grants; it does not grant access. For archival it is also the path id and must match the resolved resource."
    },
    "workspace_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1,
      "description": "Alternative workspace selector accepted by the published input. Prefer one explicit granted workspace resource; do not send conflicting selectors."
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}

Effects

  • Resolves the workspace through platform grants and can insert its identity-only local mirror before the route permission check. GET is therefore a mutation for action planning; it does not create a canonical workspace or change its name.
  • Returns device_id, workspace_id, nullable manufacturer/model/os_version and numeric first_seen/last_seen milliseconds. The device_ref storage field is omitted.
  • LIMIT 1000 has no cursor or continuation; this response does not prove fleet completeness beyond that bound.

Interpret the response

Use response path $.devices[].device_id for feed_device. An empty list does not discover a target.

Use a returned device_id for an observed device in the same granted workspace. A credential assignment can exist without an observation row, so absence does not prove no credential exists.

The success schema below was checked against captured handler responses. Polymorphic configuration and protected device assignment fields vary; exact envelope and SQL row fields are source-reviewed. Error examples retain their actual refusal shapes.

Success schema:

{
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "devices": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object",
        "properties": {
          "workspace_id": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "device_id": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "manufacturer": {
            "anyOf": [
              {
                "type": "string"
              },
              {
                "type": "null"
              }
            ]
          },
          "model": {
            "anyOf": [
              {
                "type": "string"
              },
              {
                "type": "null"
              }
            ]
          },
          "os_version": {
            "anyOf": [
              {
                "type": "number"
              },
              {
                "type": "null"
              }
            ]
          },
          "first_seen": {
            "type": "number"
          },
          "last_seen": {
            "type": "number"
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "workspace_id",
          "device_id",
          "manufacturer",
          "model",
          "os_version",
          "first_seen",
          "last_seen"
        ],
        "additionalProperties": false
      }
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "devices"
  ],
  "additionalProperties": false
}

Worked examples

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. SQL result shapes are also reviewed against migrations and handlers; empty captures do not exercise every populated export store. Live publication and read-back are separate environment evidence. Refused examples demonstrate boundaries and must not be executed as successful workflows.

Successful request

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. Captured scenario: devices are isolated per workspace: workspace A never sees workspace B's device.

Input · payload.json:

{}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list",
    "input": {},
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<identifier returned by granted resource discovery>",
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "devices": [
    {
      "workspace_id": "feed_workspace_alpha",
      "device_id": "alpha-display",
      "manufacturer": null,
      "model": null,
      "os_version": null,
      "first_seen": 1791087162900,
      "last_seen": 1791087162900
    }
  ]
}

HTTP 200. Use a returned device_id for an observed device in the same granted workspace. A credential assignment can exist without an observation row, so absence does not prove no credential exists.

Another supported request

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. Captured scenario: devices are isolated per workspace: workspace A never sees workspace B's device.

Input · payload.json:

{}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list",
    "input": {},
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<identifier returned by granted resource discovery>",
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "devices": [
    {
      "workspace_id": "feed_workspace_beta",
      "device_id": "beta-display",
      "manufacturer": null,
      "model": null,
      "os_version": null,
      "first_seen": 1791087162900,
      "last_seen": 1791087162900
    }
  ]
}

HTTP 200. Use a returned device_id for an observed device in the same granted workspace. A credential assignment can exist without an observation row, so absence does not prove no credential exists.

Refused request · HTTP 403

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. Captured scenario: a workspace header without a platform grant is refused.

Input · payload.json:

{}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 403:

{
  "error": "You do not have access to this workspace",
  "code": "workspace_forbidden"
}

HTTP 403. The handler refused this request. Resolve its exact cause before retrying; input validation can reject an invalid fixture before it reaches the handler.

Refused request · HTTP 400

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. Captured scenario: action headers enforce exact input before the analytics handler.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "unexpected": "true"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 400:

{
  "success": false,
  "error": {
    "code": "invalid_action_input",
    "message": "Invalid action input for \"analytics.devices.list\".",
    "action": "analytics.devices.list",
    "issues": [
      {
        "path": "",
        "message": "Unrecognized key: \"unexpected\"",
        "code": "unrecognized_keys"
      }
    ]
  }
}

HTTP 400. The handler refused this request. Resolve its exact cause before retrying; input validation can reject an invalid fixture before it reaches the handler.

Another supported request

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. Captured scenario: action headers enforce exact input before the analytics handler.

Input · payload.json:

{}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list",
    "input": {},
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<identifier returned by granted resource discovery>",
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "devices": []
}

HTTP 200. Use a returned device_id for an observed device in the same granted workspace. A credential assignment can exist without an observation row, so absence does not prove no credential exists.

Another supported request

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. Captured scenario: declared Feed permissions allow reads while retired lifecycle routes stay absent.

Input · payload.json:

{}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$FEED_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_feed.analytics.devices.list",
    "input": {},
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<identifier returned by granted resource discovery>",
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "devices": []
}

HTTP 200. Use a returned device_id for an observed device in the same granted workspace. A credential assignment can exist without an observation row, so absence does not prove no credential exists.

Verify the result

  • Use a returned device_id for an observed device in the same granted workspace. A credential assignment can exist without an observation row, so absence does not prove no credential exists.

Errors and recovery

  • workspace_forbidden (HTTP 403): Verify the active organization, application permission and granted workspace; an id or query parameter does not grant access.

Auth, action-input validation and platform resource resolution can refuse a request before its handler. Retain the exact error, request id and context; requesting another context is not a legitimate way to bypass a refusal.

Recovery boundary

No observed device row is altered. Credential rotation is a separate authorized security mutation.

  • Rotate Feed device credential: Replace the credential hash in a protected device assignment in the granted workspace, returning a one-time credential. An unassigned id can receive an assignment; this does not create an observed device row.

Evidence

Actual Feed Worker response using synthetic Auth, workspace grants, in-memory D1/KV and simulated source/notification transport. No live provider, encryption audit, device enrollment or external delivery is established. Credentials are excluded or explicitly redacted. SQL result shapes are also reviewed against migrations and handlers; empty captures do not exercise every populated export store. Live publication and read-back are separate environment evidence. Capture digests and test scenarios are retained in the source fixture records.