Erase Compose organization data

Permanently erase Compose-owned data for the authenticated organization with literal confirmation ERASE. Documents in review or pending review requests block erasure; other platform services retain their own records.

Outcome

Before you start

Verify the authenticated identity, environment and pinned organization before preparing an action.
The published application permission is privacy:write. The path organizationId must equal the authenticated organization. This privacy action covers every Compose workspace in that organization.
Authorize the documented effects or private-data export before CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. HTTP method alone does not establish a read-only operation.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --detail --json

Use the organization id from the authenticated identity. Organization export includes private content from every workspace; obtain the wider privacy authorization first.

Request

DELETE /api/organizations/{organizationId}/data

Save action input as payload.json. Inspect the plan for the exact path, query and body.

Inspect and test this action in the signed action console, then perform the verification below.

Input fields

Field	Required	Type	Constraints
`organizationId`	Required	string	{"minLength":1}
`confirmation`	Required	string	{}

Exact input schema:

{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "organizationId": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1
    },
    "confirmation": {
      "type": "string",
      "const": "ERASE"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "organizationId",
    "confirmation"
  ],
  "additionalProperties": false
}

Effects

Requires privacy:write and confirmation ERASE, in addition to execution confirmation.
Refuses erasure while in-review documents or pending reviews exist.
Deletes organization records sequentially across core and history and verifies remaining counts. A service failure can leave partial progress; this is not a cross-store transaction.
Does not erase Auth identity or canonical workspaces, delivered Notify records, Nexus usage or encrypted backups before their retention expiry.

Interpret the response

Use response path $.organization_id for organization_privacy_erasure. An empty list does not discover a target.

Expect HTTP 200, erased:true and zero verification counts for every Compose-owned table. Use organizations.data.export for the same organization to inspect remaining app-owned records and retained platform categories. Preserve an error and request id if verification fails.

The success schema below was checked against captured handler responses. Optional structured generation metadata and integration-dependent values can vary. Error examples retain their actual refusal shapes.

Success schema:

{
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "organization_id",
    "erased",
    "verification",
    "retained"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "organization_id": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "erased": {
      "type": "boolean"
    },
    "verification": {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "core",
        "history",
        "compose_comment_mentions"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "core": {
          "type": "object",
          "required": [
            "compose_workspaces",
            "compose_documents",
            "compose_document_comments",
            "compose_document_review_requests",
            "compose_document_export_attempts"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "compose_workspaces": {
              "type": "number"
            },
            "compose_documents": {
              "type": "number"
            },
            "compose_document_comments": {
              "type": "number"
            },
            "compose_document_review_requests": {
              "type": "number"
            },
            "compose_document_export_attempts": {
              "type": "number"
            }
          }
        },
        "history": {
          "type": "object",
          "required": [
            "compose_document_versions"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "compose_document_versions": {
              "type": "number"
            }
          }
        },
        "compose_comment_mentions": {
          "type": "number"
        }
      }
    },
    "retained": {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "topolo_auth_identity_and_canonical_workspaces",
        "delivered_notifications_under_notify_policy",
        "nexus_usage_under_provider_policy",
        "encrypted_backups_until_retention_expiry"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "topolo_auth_identity_and_canonical_workspaces": {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        "delivered_notifications_under_notify_policy": {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        "nexus_usage_under_provider_policy": {
          "type": "boolean"
        },
        "encrypted_backups_until_retention_expiry": {
          "type": "boolean"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

Worked examples

Responses were captured from the actual Compose Worker using synthetic users, organizations, content and identifiers. Tests simulate Auth, Nexus, Notify, metering and platform workspace transport and use an in-memory D1 adapter or local SQLite. They prove local handler behavior, not live model correctness, provider cost, notification delivery, real workspace grants or cross-store atomicity. HTTP 204 responses are exactly empty strings in the SDK transport. Replace fixture identifiers through credential-scoped discovery. Refused examples demonstrate boundaries and must not be executed as successful workflows.

Successful request

Actual Compose Worker response. Auth, Nexus, notifications, metering and platform workspace transport are simulated. D1 is an in-memory adapter or local SQLite as stated by the test. This does not prove a live model completion or notification delivery. No request credentials are captured. Captured scenario: Compose organization data protection > enforces authentication, organization scope, and confirmation through the real worker routes.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "organizationId": "org_test_1",
  "confirmation": "ERASE"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase",
    "input": {
      "organizationId": "org_test_1",
      "confirmation": "ERASE"
    },
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "organization_id": "org_test_1",
  "erased": true,
  "verification": {
    "core": {
      "compose_workspaces": 0,
      "compose_documents": 0,
      "compose_document_comments": 0,
      "compose_document_review_requests": 0,
      "compose_document_export_attempts": 0
    },
    "history": {
      "compose_document_versions": 0
    },
    "compose_comment_mentions": 0
  },
  "retained": {
    "topolo_auth_identity_and_canonical_workspaces": true,
    "delivered_notifications_under_notify_policy": true,
    "nexus_usage_under_provider_policy": true,
    "encrypted_backups_until_retention_expiry": true
  }
}

HTTP 200. Expect HTTP 200, erased:true and zero verification counts for every Compose-owned table. Use organizations.data.export for the same organization to inspect remaining app-owned records and retained platform categories. Preserve an error and request id if verification fails.

Another supported request

Actual Compose Worker response. Auth, Nexus, notifications, metering and platform workspace transport are simulated. D1 is an in-memory adapter or local SQLite as stated by the test. This does not prove a live model completion or notification delivery. No request credentials are captured. Captured scenario: Compose organization data protection > the privacy permissions each route publishes > exports with privacy:read and erases with privacy:write.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "organizationId": "org_test_1",
  "confirmation": "ERASE"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase",
    "input": {
      "organizationId": "org_test_1",
      "confirmation": "ERASE"
    },
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "organization_id": "org_test_1",
  "erased": true,
  "verification": {
    "core": {
      "compose_workspaces": 0,
      "compose_documents": 0,
      "compose_document_comments": 0,
      "compose_document_review_requests": 0,
      "compose_document_export_attempts": 0
    },
    "history": {
      "compose_document_versions": 0
    },
    "compose_comment_mentions": 0
  },
  "retained": {
    "topolo_auth_identity_and_canonical_workspaces": true,
    "delivered_notifications_under_notify_policy": true,
    "nexus_usage_under_provider_policy": true,
    "encrypted_backups_until_retention_expiry": true
  }
}

Refused request · HTTP 400

Input · payload.json:

{
  "organizationId": "org_test_1"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 400:

{
  "error": "erase_confirmation_required"
}

HTTP 400. The handler refused this request. Resolve its exact cause before retrying; input validation can reject an invalid fixture before it reaches the handler.

Refused request · HTTP 403

Actual Compose Worker response. Auth, Nexus, notifications, metering and platform workspace transport are simulated. D1 is an in-memory adapter or local SQLite as stated by the test. This does not prove a live model completion or notification delivery. No request credentials are captured. Captured scenario: Compose organization data protection > the privacy permissions each route publishes > refuses erase without privacy:write and leaves every row in place.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "organizationId": "org_test_1",
  "confirmation": "ERASE"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_compose.organizations.data.erase --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 403:

{
  "error": "permission_denied",
  "permission": "privacy:write"
}

HTTP 403. The handler refused this request. Resolve its exact cause before retrying; input validation can reject an invalid fixture before it reaches the handler.

Verify the result

Expect HTTP 200, erased:true and zero verification counts for every Compose-owned table.
Use organizations.data.export for the same organization to inspect remaining app-owned records and retained platform categories. Preserve an error and request id if verification fails.

Errors and recovery

erase_confirmation_required (HTTP 400): Correct the exact discovered input fields; refused fixtures are not successful requests.
permission_denied (HTTP 403): Verify the authenticated organization, application permission and granted workspace. For reviewer_required, use the legitimately assigned reviewer; requesting review grants no access.
active_compose_work_blocks_erasure (HTTP 409): Complete pending reviews through legitimate assigned decisions and inspect in-review documents. Do not delete evidence or change status merely to bypass the erasure gate. This boundary is source-reviewed and tested by the organization-data unit harness.

Auth, action-input validation and platform resource resolution can refuse a request before its handler. Retain the exact error, request id and context; requesting another context is not a legitimate way to bypass a refusal.

Recovery boundary

There is no published Compose restore action for organization erasure. Obtain explicit authorization, export necessary records first and resolve active reviews through legitimate decisions; do not bypass a blocker by deleting evidence.

Export Compose organization data: Export Compose-owned documents, versions, comments, review requests, export attempts and workspace mirrors across the authenticated organization. This private-data export requires privacy:read and explicit authorization.

Evidence

Responses were captured from the actual Compose Worker using synthetic users, organizations, content and identifiers. Tests simulate Auth, Nexus, Notify, metering and platform workspace transport and use an in-memory D1 adapter or local SQLite. They prove local handler behavior, not live model correctness, provider cost, notification delivery, real workspace grants or cross-store atomicity. HTTP 204 responses are exactly empty strings in the SDK transport. Replace fixture identifiers through credential-scoped discovery. Capture digests and test scenarios are retained in the source fixture records.

Erase Compose organization data

Outcome

Before you start

Discover the target

Request

Input fields

Effects

Interpret the response

Worked examples

Successful request

Another supported request

Refused request · HTTP 400

Refused request · HTTP 403

Verify the result

Errors and recovery

Recovery boundary

Related actions

Evidence