Create account

Outcome

Add an account to the chart. Codes are unique per workspace; a sub-account must share its parent's type.

Before you start

• Verify the intended environment, authenticated identity and specifically approved organization context.
• The published application permission is accounts:write. Discover the exact granted canonical Books workspace and bind it separately from action input.
• Approve the actual mutation, accounting inputs and any provider/recipient effects before CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. Fixture identifiers and simulated provider responses authorize no live operation.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_books.accounts.create --detail --json
topolo resources topolo-books --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-books --json

• Set BOOKS_WORKSPACE_ID to the exact granted workspace returned by discovery.
• parentId: Resolve this exact identifier through the related published reads for the same organization and workspace; never infer it from a name.

Request

POST /api/accounts

Inspect and test this action. Save the reviewed input as payload.json; supply credential/resource context separately.

Input fields

Inspect nested fields and the complete input schema.

Effects

• Adds one account to the chart. The code must be unique in the workspace and a sub-account must share its parent's type.

Interpret the response

Read $.account.id for the returned account identifier. Empty collections and nullable fields do not discover a target.

Call app_topolo_books.accounts.get with the returned id.

Inspect the success schema. CLI/MCP add their own transport envelope; CLI --detail requests the full result.

Worked examples

Actual Books route handlers and the exported Worker were exercised against five local SQLite D1 concern databases with all committed migrations, the real posting Durable Object and local R2. Route captures use synthetic verified Auth; Worker captures use synthetic Auth transports. Nexus, Brand, Notify, Pay, Mercury and Xero responses are explicitly simulated at the provider transport boundary. Captures prove local request/response behavior and canonical SDK projection, not live bank access, payment movement, email delivery, provider eligibility, tax compliance, encrypted custody, scheduled execution, deployment or production completion. Fixture identities, credentials, addresses and records authorize no live operation.

Run a reviewed request

Save the input from the selected worked example as payload.json. Validate and inspect the plan before calling the action; refused examples demonstrate errors and are not instructions to execute.

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_books.accounts.create --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_books.accounts.create --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$BOOKS_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_books.accounts.create --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$BOOKS_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --detail --json

MCP tool and arguments for the first successful example:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_books.accounts.create",
    "input": {
      "code": "6250",
      "name": "Hosting",
      "type": "expense"
    },
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<exact granted workspace id>",
    "confirm": true,
    "detail": true
  }
}

Refused response · auth_error

Input · payload.json:

{
  "code": "6250",
  "name": "Hosting",
  "type": "expense",
  "subtype": "operating"
}

Captured response · HTTP 401

{
  "error": "API key validation failed"
}

HTTP 401. SDK error code auth_error. Authenticate in the intended organization again. Verify whoami and the exact Books application/workspace binding before retrying; do not switch identity to work around a refusal.

Successful response · HTTP 201

Input · payload.json:

{
  "code": "6250",
  "name": "Hosting",
  "type": "expense"
}

Captured response · HTTP 201

{
  "account": {
    "id": "acc_e18b055c56324f60a17be4eb268253fa",
    "organization_id": "org_route_muvnp2sb19",
    "workspace_id": "ws_route_muvnp2sb19",
    "code": "6250",
    "name": "Hosting",
    "type": "expense",
    "subtype": null,
    "parent_id": null,
    "currency": null,
    "system_key": null,
    "description": null,
    "status": "active",
    "created_at": "2026-10-05T19:42:12.851Z",
    "updated_at": "2026-10-05T19:42:12.851Z",
    "source": "manual",
    "source_account_id": null
  }
}

HTTP 201. Call app_topolo_books.accounts.get with the returned id.

Refused response · forbidden

Input · payload.json:

{
  "code": "1",
  "name": "x",
  "type": "asset"
}

Captured response · HTTP 403

{
  "error": "forbidden"
}

HTTP 403. SDK error code forbidden. The credential lacks permission or the resource is outside its scope. Compare the published action permission and discovered workspace binding; obtain the appropriate authorization before another call.

Verify the result

• Call app_topolo_books.accounts.get with the returned id.

Errors and recovery

• auth_error (HTTP 401): Authenticate in the intended organization again. Verify whoami and the exact Books application/workspace binding before retrying; do not switch identity to work around a refusal.
• forbidden (HTTP 403): The credential lacks permission or the resource is outside its scope. Compare the published action permission and discovered workspace binding; obtain the appropriate authorization before another call.

These are observed local refusals. Shared authentication, schema validation and resource authorization can also refuse before the route. Preserve the actual error, details and request id.

Recovery boundary

Archive the account. Nothing new can post to it and existing history is untouched.

Related actions

• List accounts: List the chart of accounts. Filter by type or archived state, search across code, name and description, and sort by code, name, type, subtype or status.
• Archive account: Archive an account so nothing new posts to it. Accounts are never deleted; system accounts cannot be archived.

Evidence

Actual Books route handlers and the exported Worker were exercised against five local SQLite D1 concern databases with all committed migrations, the real posting Durable Object and local R2. Route captures use synthetic verified Auth; Worker captures use synthetic Auth transports. Nexus, Brand, Notify, Pay, Mercury and Xero responses are explicitly simulated at the provider transport boundary. Captures prove local request/response behavior and canonical SDK projection, not live bank access, payment movement, email delivery, provider eligibility, tax compliance, encrypted custody, scheduled execution, deployment or production completion. Fixture identities, credentials, addresses and records authorize no live operation.