Topolo Docs Topolo Platform
Open workspace

Delete segment

Delete a saved segment. Contacts and lists are not changed. The deletion is audited and cannot be undone; recreate it with segments.create.

Outcome

Delete a saved segment. Contacts and lists are not changed. The deletion is audited and cannot be undone; recreate it with segments.create.

Before you start

  • Verify the intended environment, signed-in credential, authorized organization and the action permission workspace:write.
  • Discover and select an authorized canonical Engage workspace. Pass resourceType=workspace and resourceId separately from action input.
  • Review the exact effects and obtain approval before CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. A local capture does not authorize a live mutation.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_engage.segments.delete --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-engage --json

Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to the identifier of the selected authorized workspace.

Input contract

FieldRequiredDeclared constraints
idYes{"type":"string","minLength":1,"maxLength":128}

Validate, plan and execute

Build payload.json from the current schema and discovered identifiers. The action description above defines its behavior, limits, side effects and declared errors.

: "${ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID:?Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to your selected workspace identifier}"
topolo actions validate app_topolo_engage.segments.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_engage.segments.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

Review the plan and approve its exact effects before executing the unchanged request.

: "${ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID:?Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to your selected workspace identifier}"
topolo actions call app_topolo_engage.segments.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

For MCP, use topolo_get_action, topolo_validate_action, topolo_plan_action and topolo_call_action. Pass resource context separately where required; confirm:true is required for mutations.

Captured successful requests and responses

Captured HTTP 200 · sourcing workflows over the published actions > pauses itself when its list is archived or its segment deleted, and records the failure

Action input

{
  "id": "segment_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "deleted": "segment_1"
}

Source test: sourcing-routes.test.ts. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Effects and response meaning

  • Delete a saved segment. Contacts and lists are not changed. The deletion is audited and cannot be undone; recreate it with segments.create.

Verify the outcome

  • Check the response against the declared output schema and the requested operation. For mutations, use the action-specific read described in the action description before any dependent operation.
  • For destructive results, verify the returned completion fields and stop; do not replay the request to confirm it.

Recover

For an uncertain result, inspect current retained state with a read action before retrying. Do not replay a mutation unless its contract explicitly guarantees idempotency.

Refused requests

Captured HTTP 404 · ICP filters over the published actions > segments > creates, lists, gets, updates and deletes a segment with audited writes

Action input

{
  "id": "segment_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "segment_not_found",
    "message": "Segment was not found in this workspace."
  }
}

Source test: segments-routes.test.ts. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 403 · ICP filters over the published actions > segments > refuses writes to readers and over-complex filters, but lets readers list and preview

Action input

{
  "id": "segment_1"
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "permission_denied",
    "message": "The credential lacks workspace:write.",
    "details": {
      "requiredPermission": "workspace:write"
    }
  }
}

Source test: segments-routes.test.ts. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Error recovery

  • HTTP 404 segment_not_found: Rediscover the identifier using the related list or get action in the same authorized resource. Do not guess identifiers or change organization context.
  • HTTP 403 permission_denied: Stop and inspect the current credential and selected resource. It needs workspace:write; do not broaden access or switch organization automatically.

Evidence and limits

  • /api/segments/{id}

  • sourcing-routes.test.ts

  • segments-routes.test.ts

  • Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

  • Widget/bootstrap use actual app handler but mocked worker runtime and app identity.

  • No gateway execution, live permissions, external delivery or deployed proof.

These are local route captures with synthetic identity and simulated dependencies. They do not prove live authorization, gateway execution, production state, or external delivery.