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Update sender health policy

Replace the workspace sender health policy (all five fields). Recorded in the audit trail with the previous values. The new limits apply on the next delivery event or run; seats already paused stay paused until resumed. Verify with sending.health_policy.get; roll back by updating with the previous values.

Outcome

Replace the workspace sender health policy (all five fields). Recorded in the audit trail with the previous values. The new limits apply on the next delivery event or run; seats already paused stay paused until resumed. Verify with sending.health_policy.get; roll back by updating with the previous values.

Before you start

  • Verify the intended environment, signed-in credential, authorized organization and the action permission workspace:write.
  • Discover and select an authorized canonical Engage workspace. Pass resourceType=workspace and resourceId separately from action input.
  • Review the exact effects and obtain approval before CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. A local capture does not authorize a live mutation.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_engage.sending.health_policy.update --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-engage --json

Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to the identifier of the selected authorized workspace.

Input contract

FieldRequiredDeclared constraints
hardBounceRateMaxYes{"type":"number","minimum":0,"maximum":1}
hardBounceMinSentYes{"type":"integer","minimum":1,"maximum":100000}
complaintRateMaxYes{"type":"number","minimum":0,"maximum":1}
complaintMinSentYes{"type":"integer","minimum":1,"maximum":100000}
softBounceStreakDaysYes{"type":"integer","minimum":2,"maximum":7}

Validate, plan and execute

Build payload.json from the current schema and discovered identifiers. The action description above defines its behavior, limits, side effects and declared errors.

: "${ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID:?Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to your selected workspace identifier}"
topolo actions validate app_topolo_engage.sending.health_policy.update --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_engage.sending.health_policy.update --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

Review the plan and approve its exact effects before executing the unchanged request.

: "${ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID:?Set ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID to your selected workspace identifier}"
topolo actions call app_topolo_engage.sending.health_policy.update --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$ENGAGE_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

For MCP, use topolo_get_action, topolo_validate_action, topolo_plan_action and topolo_call_action. Pass resource context separately where required; confirm:true is required for mutations.

Captured successful requests and responses

Captured HTTP 200 · sender health policy > reads the safe defaults until saved, and audits a replacement

Action input

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 0.08,
  "hardBounceMinSent": 30,
  "complaintRateMax": 0.001,
  "complaintMinSent": 100,
  "softBounceStreakDays": 4
}

Actual local response

{
  "policy": {
    "hardBounceRateMax": 0.08,
    "hardBounceMinSent": 30,
    "complaintRateMax": 0.001,
    "complaintMinSent": 100,
    "softBounceStreakDays": 4,
    "updatedAt": "2026-10-06T08:30:00.000Z"
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > reads the safe defaults until saved, and audits a replacement. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 200 · sender health policy > a stricter policy makes a seat breach

Action input

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 0.05,
  "hardBounceMinSent": 10,
  "complaintRateMax": 0.003,
  "complaintMinSent": 50,
  "softBounceStreakDays": 3
}

Actual local response

{
  "policy": {
    "hardBounceRateMax": 0.05,
    "hardBounceMinSent": 10,
    "complaintRateMax": 0.003,
    "complaintMinSent": 50,
    "softBounceStreakDays": 3,
    "updatedAt": "2026-10-06T08:30:00.000Z"
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > a stricter policy makes a seat breach. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 200 · sender health policy > reads the safe defaults until saved, and audits a replacement

Action input

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 0.08,
  "hardBounceMinSent": 30,
  "complaintRateMax": 0.001,
  "complaintMinSent": 100,
  "softBounceStreakDays": 5
}

Actual local response

{
  "policy": {
    "hardBounceRateMax": 0.08,
    "hardBounceMinSent": 30,
    "complaintRateMax": 0.001,
    "complaintMinSent": 100,
    "softBounceStreakDays": 5,
    "updatedAt": "2026-10-06T08:30:00.000Z"
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > reads the safe defaults until saved, and audits a replacement. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Effects and response meaning

  • Replace the workspace sender health policy (all five fields). Recorded in the audit trail with the previous values. The new limits apply on the next delivery event or run; seats already paused stay paused until resumed. Verify with sending.health_policy.get; roll back by updating with the previous values.

Verify the outcome

  • Check the response against the declared output schema and the requested operation. For mutations, use the action-specific read described in the action description before any dependent operation.

Recover

For an uncertain result, inspect current retained state with a read action before retrying. Do not replay a mutation unless its contract explicitly guarantees idempotency.

Refused requests

Captured HTTP 403 · sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits

Action input

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 0.05,
  "hardBounceMinSent": 20,
  "complaintRateMax": 0.003,
  "complaintMinSent": 50,
  "softBounceStreakDays": 3
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "permission_denied",
    "message": "The credential lacks workspace:write.",
    "details": {
      "requiredPermission": "workspace:write"
    }
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 422 · sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits

Refused input; do not execute

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 0.05,
  "hardBounceMinSent": 20,
  "complaintRateMax": 0.003,
  "complaintMinSent": 50,
  "softBounceStreakDays": 1
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "invalid_action_input",
    "message": "Input for sending.health_policy.update is invalid.",
    "details": [
      {
        "origin": "number",
        "code": "too_small",
        "minimum": 2,
        "inclusive": true,
        "path": [
          "softBounceStreakDays"
        ],
        "message": "Too small: expected number to be >=2"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 422 · sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits

Refused input; do not execute

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 2,
  "hardBounceMinSent": 20,
  "complaintRateMax": 0.003,
  "complaintMinSent": 50,
  "softBounceStreakDays": 3
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "invalid_action_input",
    "message": "Input for sending.health_policy.update is invalid.",
    "details": [
      {
        "origin": "number",
        "code": "too_big",
        "maximum": 1,
        "inclusive": true,
        "path": [
          "hardBounceRateMax"
        ],
        "message": "Too big: expected number to be <=1"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Captured HTTP 422 · sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits

Refused input; do not execute

{
  "hardBounceRateMax": 0.1
}

Actual local response

{
  "error": {
    "code": "invalid_action_input",
    "message": "Input for sending.health_policy.update is invalid.",
    "details": [
      {
        "expected": "number",
        "code": "invalid_type",
        "path": [
          "hardBounceMinSent"
        ],
        "message": "Invalid input: expected number, received undefined"
      },
      {
        "expected": "number",
        "code": "invalid_type",
        "path": [
          "complaintRateMax"
        ],
        "message": "Invalid input: expected number, received undefined"
      },
      {
        "expected": "number",
        "code": "invalid_type",
        "path": [
          "complaintMinSent"
        ],
        "message": "Invalid input: expected number, received undefined"
      },
      {
        "expected": "number",
        "code": "invalid_type",
        "path": [
          "softBounceStreakDays"
        ],
        "message": "Invalid input: expected number, received undefined"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Source test: sender health policy > refuses readers and invalid limits. Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

Error recovery

  • HTTP 403 permission_denied: Stop and inspect the current credential and selected resource. It needs workspace:write; do not broaden access or switch organization automatically.
  • HTTP 422 invalid_action_input: Correct the request against the current action input schema, then validate it again before planning.

Evidence and limits

  • /api/sending-settings/health-policy

  • Actual route handlers with SQLite repositories; synthetic identity/workspace grants and provider ports.

  • Widget/bootstrap use actual app handler but mocked worker runtime and app identity.

  • No gateway execution, live permissions, external delivery or deployed proof.

These are local route captures with synthetic identity and simulated dependencies. They do not prove live authorization, gateway execution, production state, or external delivery.