Revoke sharing link

Outcome

Remove one sharing record that the caller may mutate. A missing record is refused; previously downloaded bytes remain outside this operation.

Before you start

• Verify identity, pin environment and organization, and discover a granted Bytes workspace before choosing file keys.
• The action requires sharing:write. Select a verified workspace resource separately from action input; a body field cannot supply a workspace grant.
• Scope org uses the verified workspace shared root; private uses the caller’s private subtree. The accepted legacy all value resolves to org and does not grant cross-organization browsing. The bucket input cannot switch the configured R2 binding.
• Authorize the described effect or private-data export before passing CLI --confirm or MCP confirm:true. GET listing/search can persist derived data; HTTP method alone does not establish a read-only action.

Discover the target

topolo whoami --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --detail --json
topolo resources topolo-bytes --json
topolo workspaces list topolo-bytes --json
topolo actions get app_topolo_bytes.shares.list --detail --json

• File keys are paths returned by files.list/search in the selected workspace and scope. Discover the granted workspace id; do not derive access from fixture ids.

Request

DELETE /api/shares/{shareId}

Save action input as payload.json. The reviewed plan separates path identifiers, query fields and the HTTP body. Set BYTES_WORKSPACE_ID from granted resource discovery.

Inspect and test this action in the signed action console. A test response still requires the verification below.

Input fields

Exact input schema:

{
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "shareId": {
      "type": "string",
      "minLength": 1
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "shareId"
  ],
  "additionalProperties": false
}

Effects

• Deletes the stored sharing record.

Interpret the response

This response does not return a guaranteed canonical target identifier. Keep the discovered request context and interpret its documented values without inventing a resource id.

List the selected scope and verify the share id is absent; do not infer that downloaded copies have been erased.

The schema describes supported success fields; optional metadata and integration-dependent values may vary. Errors have the exact shapes shown in refused examples.

Success schema:

{
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "success"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "success": {
      "type": "boolean"
    }
  }
}

Worked examples

Actual exported Worker handlers with local Miniflare R2/KV. Auth, workspace grants, R2 multipart, notification, usage and semantic integrations are simulated at their configured test boundaries. Synthetic ids, timestamps and signed URLs confer no live access. No deployed provider outcome, external delivery or live grant is established. Upload-session credential values are explicitly redacted; binary responses use the tested SDK transport envelope. Replace synthetic identifiers through credential-scoped discovery. Refused scenarios document failure boundaries; they are not successful workflows.

Successful request

Actual worker response with local Miniflare R2/KV and simulated Auth, workspace grants and outbound integration boundaries. No authorization header is captured.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "shareId": "deb77f5a01a840a896db7ce7e5df9e6b"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$BYTES_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions call app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$BYTES_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --confirm --json

MCP tool and arguments:

{
  "tool": "topolo_call_action",
  "arguments": {
    "actionId": "app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete",
    "input": {
      "shareId": "deb77f5a01a840a896db7ce7e5df9e6b"
    },
    "resourceType": "workspace",
    "resourceId": "<identifier returned by granted resource discovery>",
    "confirm": true
  }
}

Captured local response · HTTP 200:

{
  "success": true
}

HTTP 200. List the selected scope and verify the share id is absent; do not infer that downloaded copies have been erased.

Refused request · HTTP 404

Actual worker response with local Miniflare R2/KV and simulated Auth, workspace grants and outbound integration boundaries. No authorization header is captured.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "shareId": "no-such-id"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$BYTES_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 404:

{
  "success": false,
  "error": "Share link not found"
}

HTTP 404. This request was refused; preserve the exact response and correct its cause before retrying.

Refused request · HTTP 403

Actual worker response with local Miniflare R2/KV and simulated Auth, workspace grants and outbound integration boundaries. No authorization header is captured.

Input · payload.json:

{
  "shareId": "941ac4f87554415bb050ab1f995ee5a9"
}

CLI:

topolo actions validate app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --data @payload.json --json
topolo actions plan app_topolo_bytes.shares.delete --resource-type workspace --resource-id "$BYTES_WORKSPACE_ID" --data @payload.json --json

Captured local response · HTTP 403:

{
  "error": "Forbidden",
  "message": "You do not have permission to delete this share"
}

HTTP 403. This request was refused; preserve the exact response and correct its cause before retrying.

Verify the result

• List the selected scope and verify the share id is absent; do not infer that downloaded copies have been erased.

Errors and recovery

• Share link not found (HTTP 404): Discover the existing file, share or release in the intended scope. A missing or inaccessible target is not authorization to create a replacement.
• Forbidden (HTTP 403): Verify the pinned organization, granted workspace resource and required application permission. Inspect the exact refusal before requesting narrower access; never switch scope to bypass the denial.

Authentication, the action-input validator or resource middleware can refuse a request before this handler. Preserve the exact request id, error and selected credential context. The fixtures establish no live credentials or configured provider.

Recovery boundary

Recreating a share creates different access. This action cannot restore the original revoked link or recall downloads.

Related actions

• List sharing links: Read a page of sharing records visible in the selected workspace. Only accessible stored records appear; the response redacts stored passwords.

Evidence

Actual exported Worker handlers with local Miniflare R2/KV. Auth, workspace grants, R2 multipart, notification, usage and semantic integrations are simulated at their configured test boundaries. Synthetic ids, timestamps and signed URLs confer no live access. No deployed provider outcome, external delivery or live grant is established. Upload-session credential values are explicitly redacted; binary responses use the tested SDK transport envelope. Capture digests and test scenarios are retained in the source fixture records.